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We study a modified prisoner’s dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices.
The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the
generations each player update its strategy by following one of the neighboring strategies with a probability
dependent on the payoff difference. The neighbor selection obeys a dynamic preferential rule, i.e., the more
frequently a neighbor’s strategy was adopted by the focal player in the previous rounds, the larger probability it
will be chosen to refer to in the subsequent rounds. It is found that cooperation is substantially promoted due to
this simple selection mechanism. Corresponding analysis is provided by the investigations of the distribution of
players’ impact weights, persistence, and as well as correlation function.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.50.+q, 87.23.Cc, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory and its evolutionary context are efficient
frameworks to study complex behaviors of biological, ecolog-
ical, social and economic systems [1, 2, 3, 4]. Of particular
renown is the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG)
which has attracted much attention in theoretical and experi-
mental studies [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In the original PDG, players can
make two choices: either to cooperate with their co-players or
to defect. They are offered some payoffs dependent on their
choices, which can be expressed by a 2 × 2 payoff matrix in
agreement with the four possibilities. The players get rewards
R (or punishment P ) if both choose to cooperate (or defect).
If one player cooperates while the other defects, then the co-
operator (C) gets the lowest payoff S (sucker’s payoff), while
the defector (D) gains the highest payoff T (the temptation
to defect). Thus the elements of the payoff matrix satisfy the
conditions: T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S, so that lead
to a so-called dilemma situation where mutual cooperation is
beneficial in a long perspective but egoism can produce big
short-term profits.
One of the most interesting items on the PDG is to study un-
der what conditions mutual cooperation will emerge and sus-
tain stably or how to facilitate the cooperation of the whole
population [2, 3, 4]. In the evolutionary PDG, the state that
all players are defectors has been proved to be an evolution-
ary stable state [4], which has inspired numerous investiga-
tions of suitable extensions that enable cooperation to persist.
Nowak and May [8] introduced a spatial evolutionary PDG
model in which individuals located on a lattice play with their
neighbors and with themselves. The dynamics is governed
by a deterministic rule: in each subsequent round, individuals
adopt the strategy that has gained the highest payoff among its
neighbors (including also themselves) in the previous round.
It has been shown that the spatial effects promote substantially
the survival of cooperators [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. The enhance-
ment of cooperation on lattice-like spatial structure is robust
even if some specified distance interactions are allowed [11].
Szabo´ and To˝ke extended the deterministic dynamics to a
stochastic evolutionary one [13]: rather than following the
most successful neighbor’s strategy straightly, the adoption
of one of the neighboring strategies is allowed with a prob-
ability dependent on the payoff difference. This revised ver-
sion took into account the irrational choices of the players. It
was observed that a stable absorbing state of all C emerged
when the temptation to defect is below a certain critical value
(noise-dependent). Vainstein and Arenzon studied the PDG
on a diluted lattice [14] and found that cooperation is eas-
ier to maintain due to blocking the spreading of defection
caused by the empty sites on the lattice. The investigations
of the PDG on random graphs have shown that cooperation
is strongly enhanced for lattices with fluctuating connectiv-
ity in comparison with fixed connectivity lattice [15]. In the
past few years, the PDG has been studied on different so-
cial network models. It was found that cooperation can be
maintained on these networks in a wide range of network pa-
rameters [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. In addition, several
mechanisms were also introduced to sustain high concentra-
tion of cooperators, such as voluntary participation [21], dy-
namic network model [23] and dynamic payoff matrices [24],
and so on. Very recently, Santos et al. studied the PDG and
snowdrift games on scale-free networks. Their results indi-
cated that the heterogeneity of networks favors the emergence
of cooperation [25].
Though many intriguing fruits have been obtained in un-
derstanding the emergence of cooperation in spatial PDG
[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22],
it would also be interesting to explore other mechanisms to
enhance the cooperative behavior. In the present work, we
make further studies of the evolutionary PDG using Szabo´-
To˝ke version [13] on two-dimensional disordered square lat-
tices. Considering individuals heterogeneously affected by
their neighbors in society, we introduce impact weight to each
one of the interacting players. Based on the player’s impact
weights, a dynamic preferential selection (DPS) mechanism
is incorporated into the spatial PDG to model dynamic behav-
iors of human communities. It will be shown that the DPS
promotes substantially the cooperative behavior of the players
which may provide a new perspective in understanding the
persistence of cooperation in realistic world.
In the next section, evolutionary rules of the game are ex-
plained. In Sec. III, simulation results of our model imple-
2mented on disordered lattices are presented and, in Sec. IV,
the effects of the DPS on the evolution of cooperation is stud-
ied in detail. Conclusions are given in the last section.
II. THE MODEL
We consider the evolutionary PDG with players located
on the two-dimensional disordered square lattice which is
characterized by a total φ portion of randomly rewired links
with fixed number of neighbors of each site (in the limit
φ → 1.0, the “disordered lattice”is in fact a regular random
graph [21, 26]). This approach excludes those effects coming
from the fluctuation of the number of neighbors as it happens
on diluted lattices [14], random graphs [15], and scale-free
networks [25]. Similar consideration has also been made in
Refs. [22, 26]. The players are pure strategists and can fol-
low only two simple strategies: C (cooperate) and D (defect).
Each player plays a PDG with itself and with its neighbors,
and collects payoffs dependent on the payoff-matrix parame-
ters. The total payoffs of a certain player is the sum over all
interactions. Following common practices [8, 13, 16, 18], the
elements of the payoff matrix can be rescaled, i.e., choosing
R = 1, P = S = 0, and T = b (1.0 < b < 2.0) to represent
the advantage of defectors over cooperators. We have checked
that the properties of the simulation results do not change for
S = −ǫ (0.0 < ǫ≪ 1.0).
In society, some special persons may influence others much
stronger than the average individual [18]. In other words, dif-
ferent neighbors would have different impacts on one’s be-
havior. In general, one can expect that the influence between
two individuals would be asymmetric and time-dependent. To
model this situation, we define a quantity Aij(t), which de-
scribes the impact weight of the jth player on the ith player at
time t and possesses the asymmetric property, i.e., Aij(t) 6=
Aji(t). In this way, we hope to catch some general effects of
the dynamic asymmetric influence among interacting players
on the dynamical behavior of the game.
After each round of the game, players are allowed to inspect
their neighbors’ payoffs and change their strategies in the next
round according to the comparisons. The randomly chosen
player i revises its strategy by selecting one of its neighbors j
with a probability γ in terms of a preferential selection rule:
γij =
Aij(t)∑
k∈Ωi
Aik(t)
, (1)
where Ωi is the community composing of the nearest neigh-
bors of i. Eq. (1) means that the stronger the impact of
a neighbor is, the larger probability it is selected to com-
pare with. If and only if their strategies are different, the ith
player’s state as well as the neighbor’s impact weight will be
updated, otherwise nothing happens (no strategy transforma-
tion and impact weight update). Following ideas developed by
Szabo´ et al. [13, 21, 22, 26], given the total payoffs (Ei and
Ej for the ith and jth players, respectively) from the previous
round, the player i adopts j’s strategy with the probability
W =
1
1 + exp [−(Ej − Ei)/κ]
, (2)
where κ characterizes the noise introduced to permit irrational
choices. It should be noted that the transformation is only af-
fected by their payoff difference. We set the value of κ to 0.1,
similar to that in Refs. [13, 21, 22, 26]. Generating a random
number r from a uniform distribution in the interval (0, 1), if
r < W (or r > W ), the player j’s strategy is accepted (or
discarded) by the player i and Aij(t) is revised according to
the following rule
Aij(t+ 1) = Aij(t)(1± α), (3)
where the minus corresponds to the case of r > W , denoting
no strategy updating for the ith player. Initially, all Aij(0) are
assigned to 1.0. The parameter α in Eq. (3) can be depicted
as a multiplication factor which characterizes qualitatively the
relative change of the impact weight in each round. Larger α
corresponds to stronger strengthening (or losing) of impact. In
subsequent investigations, the value of α is constrained in the
range (0, 1) to ensure no negative elements in Aij(t), which
means that all opinions (C andD in the present case) have op-
portunities to be followed. If strategies of the players spread
successfully, they can be called as “winners”regardless of the
payoffs (for example, due to the noise, the worse performance
strategy also has a certain probability to take over a better per-
formance one). Thus, this rule (Eq. (3)) could be termed
as: “win-strengthen, lose-weaken”. The more frequently a
player’s strategy followed by its neighbors, the larger proba-
bility it will be picked up to refer to in the subsequent genera-
tions, and vice versa.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In what follows three groups of systems will be considered:
(i) regular square lattices (φ = 0.0 with α = 0.0, 0.01, 0.1,
and 0.3, respectively); (ii) weak disordered lattices (φ = 0.1
with the same values of α as before); (iii) strong disordered
lattices (φ = 1.0 with the same values of α as the former).
On the one hand (as a byproduct), we want to understand how
the underlying disordered structures affect the evolution of the
PDG; on the other hand (as the main aim), we try to explore
the potentiality of the DPS (in combination with the disor-
dered structures) on the evolution of cooperation.
All the simulations are performed in systems with 300×300
players. Starting from a random initial state with equal frac-
tion of C and D, we iterate the model with synchronous up-
date. The evolution eventually leads to dynamic equilibrium
states with small fluctuations of the cooperator density around
an average value. The parameterα, which determines the evo-
lution of impact weights, is not critical, and convergence has
been verified for all values of α between 0 and 1. A key quan-
tity is the density of cooperators, ρC , which is defined as the
average fraction of players adopting the strategyC in the equi-
librium state. The total sampling times were 105 Monte-Carlo
(MC) steps [27], and the equilibrium density of cooperators
was obtained by averaging over the last 104 steps. Each data
point (in Figs. 1 and 2) results from an average over 10 real-
izations for the same type of disordered lattices specified by
the parameter φ.
3The dependence of ρC on b in the equilibrium state for dif-
ferent values of φ and α, are shown in Fig. 1. The main
features in the steady state are similar to the results reported
in Ref. [13], i.e., there exist two different absorbing states
(ρC = 1 and ρC = 0) separated by the active phase (coexis-
tence of C and D). We have found numerically that ρC = 1 in
all the cases we are interested in when b < 5/4, which can be
regarded as a homogeneous cooperation state. Since our main
aim goes beyond this trivial steady-state, we will only con-
centrate on the region of b > 5/4, where new features may
emerge.
First, we consider the model without DPS (α = 0.0). In
the case of φ = 0.0, which corresponds to the regular square
lattice, we recover the results of the stochastic model [13],
i.e. ρC decreases monotonically with the increase of b and
vanishes at a threshold bc. When long range links emerge on
the lattice (φ = 0.1), the level of cooperation is promoted (a
larger threshold bc in Fig. 1(b) than that in Fig. 1(a)), which is
different from previous reports that local interactions promote
the sustainment of cooperation (see Refs. [8, 9, 10, 12] and
the references therein). Particularly, in the case of φ = 1.0
(corresponding to a regular random graph), where the spatial
correlation is very weak, cooperation is enhanced further (if
it is just measured by the value of bc). Even in the case of
b > 2.0, minor fractional cooperators can be found in a sea of
defectors.
These results can be understood in the following way. On
the one hand, in our model, the state transformation of the
players conforms to a Fermi function (see Eq. (2)) suggested
by Szabo´ et al. [13, 21, 22, 26]. Using this update rule, they
have also found that long range interactions enhance the co-
operation when the PDG (with no self-interactions included)
was performed on regular random graphs [21]. On the other
hand, self-interactions are included in the present work. Re-
cently, Hauert and Doebeli have studied another famous evo-
lutionary game, snowdrift game, on different types of lattice
[28]. They have found that the spatial structure eliminates
cooperation for intermediate and high cost-to-benefit ratio of
cooperation because benefits of costly cooperative acts accrue
not only to others but also to the cooperator itself [28, 29].
As to our PDG model, each player C plays with itself be-
sides its nearest neighbors, which indicates that it will gain at
least R payoff even in the worst case (surrounding by four de-
fectors). In a different interpretation, besides their neighbors,
the cooperators’ investment will benefit themselves too. Note
that the high cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation in snowdrift
game corresponds to large values of b in the PDG. Consider-
ing these two factors, it is not surprising that the disordered
structure can promote cooperation in the present model.
We now focus our attention on the influence of the DPS
on the game evolution. The results obtained for α =
0.01, 0.1, 0.3 are summarized in Fig. 1. Although qualitative
behaviors are similar to those of the random selection case,
there are some remarkable quantitative differences. The simu-
lation results depend strongly on both the parameters φ and α.
For well structured populations (φ = 0, regular square lattice
case) with α = 0.01, the DPS promotes cooperation for small
b in comparison with the random selection case. For large b,
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FIG. 1: (color online). Average density of cooperators, ρc, as a func-
tion of the temptation to defect b in the equilibrium state. Filled and
open symbols correspond to the cases of random selection and pref-
erential selection, respectively.
however, the tendency is reversed and the fraction of cooper-
ators is somewhat lower than the corresponding value in the
case of α = 0.0. There exists a cross point for b separating
the two regions which depends on α: for α = 0.01, b ≈ 1.5.
For the other two values of α (0.1 and 0.3), the DPS enhances
greatly the cooperation with respect to otherwise. In the cases
of disordered structural populations (φ = 0.1 and 1.0), for all
the values of α considered here, the cooperative behavior can
be substantially promoted (see Figs. 1(b) and 1(c)) and main-
tained even in the extreme defection circumstance (b > 2.0),
where the game is not a proper Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is strik-
ingly interesting that, for disordered structural populations, all
the curves nearly collapse into a single curve (shown in Figs.
1(b) and 1(c)) when the DPS is introduced into the game. The
visible difference exists only in the region where cooperators
are going to extinction. The largerα gives rise to larger thresh-
old bc. The data collapsing is also found in well structured
populations for large α (see Fig. 1(a)).
From these observed features, we argue that, whether the
underlying “lattice”is well structured or disordered, as soon
as the multiplication factor α is finite and sufficiently large,
the enhancement of cooperation will be to some extent real-
ized. Despite of the fact that the disordered structure prefers
to favor the emergence of cooperation, the much stronger en-
hancement of cooperative behavior for α > 0.0 than that for
α = 0.0 implies that the DPS plays a crucial role in the dy-
namics.
In Fig. 2, we show the plots of ρC as a function of α for
three special values of b, to emphasize the changes in behav-
iors as the lattice varies. The colored dashed lines correspond
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FIG. 2: (color online). Average density of cooperators, ρc, as a
function of the multiplication factor, α, for three special values of
b (colored symbols). The colored lines correspond to random selec-
tion cases (α = 0.0): dashed (black) for φ = 0.0, dotted (red) for
φ = 0.1, and dash-dotted (blue) for φ = 1.0, respectively.
to the results obtained for the random selection case and the
symbols for the DPS case. Different colors denote different
disordered degree of the lattice: black for φ = 0.0, red for
φ = 0.1 and blue for φ = 1.0, respectively. Note that only
the curves for φ = 0.0 have a clear sensitivity to the values
of α (black squares in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)). The temptation
to defect, b, has also an influence on the results. In the cases
of small α with φ = 0.0, for low temptation (b = 1.48), the
cooperation level is slightly higher for the DPS case than that
for the random selection case; whereas for high temptation
(b = 1.75), the phenomenon is reversed. The Similar discrep-
ancy can also be found for large values of α with φ = 0.0: the
spatial structure promotes slightly the cooperation level for
b = 1.48 (see Fig. 2(a)), and yet inhibits that for b = 1.75 (see
Fig. 2(b)). The transition point seems to be around α ≈ 0.06.
Since regular lattices are not realistic representations of most
actual population structures [30], especially human (because
of the mobility and dispersal ability of the individuals), we do
not comment further on these trivial results and focus our at-
tention on those issues where disordered structures are present
(φ = 0.1 and 1.0).
Now taking a look at Figs. 2(a), (b) and (c), we clearly
observe that for any finite values of α we are interested in,
given fixed values of b and φ, the cooperation level is almost
independent of α, and the relative deviation of the results is
less than 5%. Despite of this point, we would like to point out
that the enhancement of cooperation appears also insensitive
to the special values of φ, i.e., more disordered structures have
little essential influence on the evolutionary results, at least,
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FIG. 3: (color online). Histograms (over 105 time steps) of impact
weights of players in the equilibrium state. Only the data which fall
into the region [10−16 , 1016] are shown. The power-law decaying be-
havior determined by the intrinsic nature of Eq. (3) is visible in both
the very large limit and the very small limit of the impact weights.
for the case of 0.1 < φ < 1.0. This problem should deserve
to make further investigations in the future work.
To end up this section, let us review the novel features of
the results obtained by computer simulations. When intro-
ducing the DPS to the evolutionary PDG, we have found that
the cooperative behavior in the populations is substantially en-
hanced with respect to the random selection case. The en-
hancement is robust against whether the underlying lattice is
well structured or disordered. Though the evolutionary results
depend on both φ and α, as long as the underlying lattice is
finitely disordered and the multiplication factor α is also suf-
ficiently large (e.g., α > 0.003 in the present studied cases
[31]), the resulting cooperation level seems insensitive to both
φ and α for fixed values of b.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Before discussing the further details as to why the above
evolutionary results may occur, we briefly review those results
obtained for the evolutionary PDG performed on the regular
lattice. Generally, we are more interested in the region near
the extinction threshold of cooperators, from which we can
figure out clearly cooperators’ evolution and surviving in the
sea of defectors. For this issue, Hauert et al. [21, 28] have
found that cooperators can survive by forming large, compact
clusters which minimize the exploitation by defectors. Along
the boundary, cooperators can outweigh their losses against
defectors by gains from interactions within the cluster . Simi-
lar phenomena were observed earlier by Szabo´ and To˝ke [13].
The compact clusters composing of cooperators do random
walks and spread out in the background of defectors. Though,
occasionally a cluster splits into two or two clusters collide,
merge, or annihilate and vanish [21], the compact structures
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FIG. 4: (color online). Persistence function Pc(t, tw) and correlation function Qc(t, tw) for different combinations of b, φ and α as a function
of time interval t − tw where tw = 95000. Inset: time evolution of the persistence function P (t, tw) for both strategies C and D. That
the persistence Pc(t, tw) goes to zero in the long time limit indicates the random walk and annihilation of cooperators, whereas the non-zero
plateau of it implies the stable maintenance of the communities of the cooperators. The plots of Qc(t, tw) also give the same hints, which
sustains the level of the datum time tw for the stable maintenance case, and displays the mean-field behavior for the random walk case. See
the text for details.
of the surviving clusters can remain in principle unchanged.
The problem can be viewed more explicitly: when the play-
ers’ strategy update is implemented by randomly selecting a
neighbor to compare with according to Eq. (3), the compact
structures favor those internal cooperators to forming a stable
core, since the components interact only with players taking
over strategyC. The existence of this core enables those coop-
erators on surface to have enough channels to collect payoffs
so that they can resist the invading of defectors, which in re-
turn reinforce the stability of the core. The mutual protection
(or reciprocity) of the cooperators enables the compact struc-
tures to sustain stably, and hence contributes to the persistence
of cooperation.
Motivated by the above interpretations, some conjecture on
the origin of those results of our model with the presence of
DPS depicted in Sec. III may be appropriate here. We think
that the DPS could induce the emergence of pairs of influential
co-players, and when some of them are cooperators, they will
“always”refer to their influential neighbors’ strategies in the
subsequent generations, then communities consisting of their
neighbors and themselves may form and survive stably in the
background of defectors, which would contribute to the per-
sistence of cooperation. Those influential co-players taking
over strategy C can be regarded as the core of the communi-
ties (or clusters). To test this speculation, we check the prob-
ability distribution of Aij(t) in the equilibrium state, which is
expected to have a broad distribution so that there could arise
a large enough fraction of influential co-players (being coop-
erators) to form stable core in populations.
In Figure 3, we plot probability distributions of Aij(t) for
four different combinations of b and φ and with corresponding
three values of α: b = 1.48, φ = 0.0 (Fig. 3(a)); b = 1.75,
φ = 0.0 (Fig. 3(b)); b = 1.9375, φ = 0.1 (Fig. 3(c));
and b = 2.0, φ = 1.0 (Fig. 3(d)), respectively. As indi-
cated, there are very large broad distributions of Aij(t) except
for two combinations, (b = 1.48, φ = 0.0, α = 0.01) and
(b = 1.75, φ = 0.0, α = 0.01). These two combinations do
not favor the emergence of cooperation (see Fig. 1(a) for the
symbols of red circles) in contrast to other combinations, and
also do not provide sufficient conditions for players to form
stable clusters which can be seen in the following part. It is
worthy to point out that the combinations of well structured
populations with sufficiently large α values (Figs. 3(a) and
3(b)) or disordered populations with finite α values (Figs. 3(c)
and 3(d)) resulting in broad histograms of Aij(t) indeed facil-
itate the cooperative behavior compared with corresponding
random selection cases (α = 0.0), which have been verified
by previous simulations (see Figs. 1 and 2).
To prove that some fractional players may form stable clus-
ters in the presence of the DPS in a more detailed way, we
measured the persistence function PC(t, tw), the fraction of
cooperators that do not change strategy between an initial
waiting time tw, and the time t ≥ tw [14]. In addition, the
correlation function QC(t, tw), which characterizes the frac-
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FIG. 5: Right panel: illustration of cooperators and defectors at time t = 9.5 × 104. Middle panel: snapshot showing players that remain
unchanged between MC time t = 9.5×104 and 105: the pinned cooperators, defectors, and the active players are denoted by dark gray boxes,
light gray boxes, and white vacancy, respectively. Right panel: only the pinned cooperators are shown. Parameters: φ = 0.0, b = 1.75, α =
0.1.
tion of cooperators at time t that have arisen at time tw in spite
of finitely many times flipping of the strategy during the two
time interval, is also explored. In a distinct view, the results of
these two quantities as a function of the time interval t − tw
(measured in MC steps, the time tw can be selected arbitrarily
as long as the systems had attained equilibrium) are summa-
rized in Fig. 4 on a log-linear scale for tw = 95000.
For the cases of well structured populations with suffi-
ciently large α (Fig. 4(d)) or disordered populations with fi-
nite α (Figs. 4(e) and 4(f)), after an initial decrease, the per-
sistence attains, for large time intervals, a plateau whose value
depends on the parameters b, φ and γ. Interestingly, for a non-
Hamiltonian model we studied here, the decaying behavior of
the persistence in the equilibrium is exponential at large time
intervals, just like that has been observed commonly in Hamil-
tonian models and in site diluted lattice model [32]. If the
persistence does not go to zero, there is a fraction of sites of
cooperators that flip only finitely many times (blocking), and
domain wall movements are constrained (pinning) [14]. For
the present systems we studied, it indicates that communities
of cooperators exist stably in the background of defectors. In
the cases of random selection (no matter whether the popula-
tions are well structured or disordered, Figs. 4(a) and 4(c))
or well structured populations with very small α (Fig. 4(b)),
however, the persistence goes to zero in the long time inter-
val limit, which means that all the cooperators are renewed
completely after finite waiting time. This is reminiscent of
the random walk and annihilation [13]. The persistence func-
tion P (t, tw) for both strategies C and D shown in insets also
displays the similar characteristics.
The time dependence of the correlation function QC(t, tw)
also reflects the same evolving behavior of the systems. For
well structured populations with sufficiently large α (Fig.
4(d)) or disordered populations with finite α (Figs. 4(e) and
4(f)),QC(t, tw) fluctuates weakly around the average fraction
of cooperators, ρC , indicating the stable maintenance of the
communities of cooperators. For the random selection case
(Figs. 4(a) and 4(c)) or well structured populations with very
small α (Fig. 4(b)), the random walks and annihilation of
cooperators causes the long time correlation to be indepen-
dent of the initial state, which can be calculated roughly by
a mean-field method. Since the spread of cooperators can be
regarded as walking randomly in such cases, the probability
of revisiting those sites which had been visited before will
be proportional to the average density of cooperators. As-
suming that the fraction of cooperators is equal to ρ(tw) at
time tw (the system has already attained equilibrium before
this time), the mean-field approximation gives the relation,
QC(t, tw) ≈ ρC × ρ(tw), in the long time limit, t → ∞.
As shown in Figs. 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c), the analysis is in well
agreement with numerical simulations.
For an intuitive understanding of the surviving of coopera-
tors, in Fig. 5 we present snapshots of the system in the equi-
librium state under the condition of φ = 0, b = 1.75, α = 0.1,
showing both active and pinned players. These snapshots are
a 50×50 portion of the full 300×300 lattice. Cooperators and
defectors are shown in dark gray and light gray boxes, respec-
tively. The white vacancy denotes active players. This typical
configuration is almost stable and the small amount of active
sites is confined to a few regions. It is shown that most cooper-
ator clusters remain unchanged confirming previous analysis.
At last, it should be pointed out that it is only qualita-
tively depicted that the large broad distributions of the impact
weights favor the formation of stable clusters. The quantita-
tive analysis on this issue, however, is unimplemented. The
work along this line is in progress.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have explored the general question of co-
operation formation and sustainment from the perspective of
the coevolution between the dynamics of players’ states and
their inter-influential relationships. By considering asymmet-
ric and heterogenous influential effects in many natural popu-
lations, we defined impact weights for any pairs of neighbor-
7ing individuals, which describes the influence of one player on
another and evolves timely. Based on this quantity, a dynamic
preferential selection (DPS) mechanism was introduced to the
dynamics of an evolutionary PDG. To simulate the mobility
and dispersal ability of individuals, the disordered structure of
populations was also taken into account.
Although disordered structure has been proved to favor the
emergence of cooperation, it was found that the DPS plays
a crucial role in determining the evolutionary results of the
game. In fact, for well structured populations with strong
multiplication effects (large α) or disordered structural popu-
lations with the presence of the DPS, the cooperative behavior
can be substantially promoted. These findings are presented
for some specific sets of parameter values of b, φ and α, but
they are qualitatively the same for a broad range of values.
By analyzing the probability distribution of Aij(t) in the long
time limit, the persistence function PC(t, tw) and the correla-
tion function QC(t, tw) for the cooperators in the equilibrium
state, we found that the DPS gives rise to very large broad
distributions of the impact weights, which favor the influen-
tial cooperators to form stable communities, and thereby con-
tribute to the emergence and persistence of cooperation. One
interesting result is that the enhancement of cooperation, once
realized, is insensitive to some special values of φ and α. That
is to say, the enhancement of cooperation in the presence of
the DPS is general and robust, especially for finitely disor-
dered structural populations. Another intriguing result is that,
given the appropriate multiplication factor α, cooperators can
always persist in the whole range of 1.0 < b < 2.0 for disor-
dered structural populations, providing an escape hatch out of
states of mutual defection predicted by both classical and evo-
lutionary game theory. Thus, the DPS is capable of changing
the doomed fate of cooperators and ensuring them to persist
even under harsh conditions when b → 2.0. Although it is
simple, the present model offers an efficient way to simulate
real social behaviors, and might shed lights in understanding
the evolution of cooperation in complex social systems where
asymmetry, heterogeneity, and feedback are ubiquitous.
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